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1. Introduction
The main aim of this paper is to argue that a right to oblivion should be concep-
tualised as a human right and more specifically, as an expression of the broader 
right to privacy, which itself is approached as a multidimensional concept.
Firstly, I will discuss the right to oblivion as a phenomenon, in other words, how 
it is prima facie presented in the current debate. Secondly, I will explain how the 
current legal framework fails to offer a holistic conceptualisation of a right to 
oblivion. Thirdly, I will argue that, as the term itself reveals, the concept should 
be discussed from a human rights-based approach rather than from a mere con-
trol-based perspective. More particularly, I will suggest that the right to oblivion 
should be conceptualised as part of the right to privacy, as a multidimensional 
concept. 
2. The right to oblivion as a modern phenomenon 
As the term itself suggests, the concept of the right to oblivion is related to the 
broad concepts of ‘remembering’ and ‘forgetting’, the “duality of human memory”1. 
Should in fact everything be remembered?2 Is there some value on ‘forgetting’ cer-
tain information and if so, what should be forgotten and when? Even though these 
questions constitute the main areas of dispute among the authors, it seems that most 
of the available attempts made to answer them, as part of the on-going debate to the 
right to oblivion, have not yet provided a systematic approach to this issue.
Forgetting is a “natural mentation for human beings”3. It provides us with peace 
of mind, mental growth, and positive human r elationship-building, assisting, 
1.  Bannon L. J., Forgetting as a feature, not a bug: the duality of memory and implication for 
ubiquitous computing (2006) CoDesign, vol. 2, no. 1, pp. 3-15, at 13.
2.  See Mayer V., The Virtue of Forgetting in the Digital Age, (2009), Princeton University Press.
3.  Murata K. & Orito Y., The right to forget/be forgotten, (2001) in Proceedings of CEPE (Com-
puter Ethics: Philosophical Enquiry), University of Lancaster, 6, pp. 192-201, 193.
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therefore, in the establishment of a personal identity4. This value is argued to 
be threatened by the development of ICT, as it effectively enforces the idea that 
everything should be remembered. However, critics counter that “the total cap-
ture and recall of a society’s (or even an individual’s) works and activities has 
never been, and is unlikely ever to be, possible”, despite the rapid evolution of 
ICT technologies5. 
Secondly, to be forgotten is argued to allow the opportunity for a “fresh start” 6. 
According to this view, “it is socially beneficial to encourage individuals to re-
form their lives [and therefore not] be barred by their past ‘mistakes’” when en-
tering into soci al and economic life7.Taking the opposite view, Peter Fleischer, 
Google’s Chief Privacy officer, understands the right to oblivion as “an attempt 
to give people the right to wash away digital muck, or delete the embarrassing 
stuff”8. He argues that “history should be remembered, not forgotten, even if it’s 
painful”. According to Fleischer, “culture is memory”. One response to this ar-
gument is that human cultures seem to have been built over the course of time 
through a process of selective remembering and forgetting, not through total 
remembering, as this was simply not possible until recently (and still is not in 
most parts of the world). Despite this, it might worth considering that a “right to 
remember as much as possible” may have some benefits to our political system 
which could themselves be undermined by putting forward a potential right to 
oblivion 9. As has been characteristically written: “I don’t want a world where 
politicians or demagogues can get their dodgy past involvements with fascism 
[..] or whatever quietly deleted or rendered un-findable on Google”10. To the con-
trary, it has been suggested that such power to forget and be forgotten is not 
merely an individual good but in essence a social value, that benefits society as 
a whole, as it allows the independent self-development of individuals as demo-
4.  Murata K. & Orito Y., ibid, at 194.
5.  Lievrouw L. A., The Next Decade in Internet Time: Ways Ahead for New Media Studies, pre-
sented (2011) in A Decade in Internet Time: Symposium on the Dynamics of the Internet and 
Society, Oxford Internet Institute, 21-24 September 2011, p. 11.
6.  Blanchette J. F. & Johnson D.G., Data retention and the panoptic society: The social benefits of 
forgetfulness’ (1998), ACM Policy ’98 Conference, LSE, p. 4.
7.  Westin A. F. and Baker M. A., Databanks in a free society: Computers, record keeping, and pri-
vacy (1972) New York: Quadrangle/New York Times Book Company, p. 267.
8.  Fleischer P., Foggy thinking about the Right to Oblivion, http://peterfleischer.blogspot.
com/2011/03, see also Rosen J., The right to be forgotten, 64 Stan. L. Rev. Online 88.
9.  Edwards L., The Rights to forget of the right to spin?, panGloss, 18.03.2012, available at 
http://blogscript-to-forget, last access June 10, 2013.
10.  Edwards L., ibid.
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cratic citizens. In other words, no forgetfulness, no effective democratic citizens. 
However, the opposite extreme seems to be equally unacceptable. “A world in 
which individuals are not held accountable over time for the consequences of 
their actions will not produce the sense of responsibility that is just as necessary 
to a democratic society”11. Unavoidably, a balancing act will be needed.
Critics have also argued that it is difficult, if not impossible, to predict what infor-
mation might be useful in the future, and that allowing the deletion of data without 
careful consideration of its implications in the future might lead to having impor-
tant information “inaccessible, incomplete and/or misrepresentative of reality” 12. 
This argument may be relevant when it relates to facts and events of public impor-
tance or public policy, but fails to explain how it can justify preventing a person 
from exercising full control over his personal information when this can have no 
consequential implications on the history of a state or nation.
Finally, other legal arguments have been presented, that introducing a right to 
oblivion creates a presumption that privacy is more important than other poten-
tially conflicting human rights such as freedom of speech 13, or other values such 
as freedom of journalism and literature, or other principles such as security or 
data integrity 14. 
Overall, the diversity of ideas outlined above underscores the point that there is no 
unified approach to the concept in question. Furthermore, it confirms Bernal’s ob-
servation that the concept of a right to oblivion “provokes emotional and instinctive 
reactions, often very negative, rather than rational and thoughtful responses” 15, par-
ticularly since the discussion around the world has only recently taken shape. 
3. The right to oblivion in the digital world 
In 2009, France launched a “Charter of good practices on the right to be forgotten on 
social networks and search engines”16, which invited signing parties to adopt meas-
11.  Blanchette J. F., supra note at 6.
12.  See Ausloos J., The ‘‘Right to be Forgotten” – Worth Remembering? (2012) Computer Law & 
Security Review (2 8C2), p. 7 and the references provided.
13.  Data Protection: forget about a “right to forget”, 28.03.2011 available at http://amber-
hawk.typepad.com/amberhawk/2011, last accessed June 10, 2013.
14.  Kierkegaard S., et al., 30 years on – The review of the Council of Europe Data Protection 
Convention (2011) 108, Computer Law & Security Review 27, pp. 223-231, at 227.
15.  Bernal P. A., A Right to Delete? (2011) European Journal of Law and Technology, vol. 2, 
 issue 2, p. 2.
16.  «Charte du droit à l’oubli dans les sites collaboratifs et les moteurs de recherche».
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ures that facilitate protection of the personal data of the web users 17. Furthermore, 
based on the French initiative, there is an ongoing discussion on the potential inclu-
sion of a right to oblivion (mentioned, however, as a right to be forgotten) in the 
framework of the Council of Europe18, while the European Commission (“EC”) has 
just published a widely debated proposal on the review of the EU Data Protection 
legal framework where a separate “right to be forgotten and to erasure” has been 
included. Despite this hyperactivity in the legal world, as a prima facie observation 
there is still no universal agreement on what a right to oblivion is and what it aims to 
protect. 
3.1 The inefficiency of current data protection mechanisms 
Given the heated debate on the nature and scope of the right to oblivion, it is 
hardly surprising that the ongoing disagreement extends to the question of 
whether this right already exists within the current legal framework19. 
Focusing on the EU legal framework, Article 16(1) of the Treaty on the Func-
tioning of the European Union (“TFEU”) provides that “everyone has the right to 
the protection of personal data concerning them”. Similarly, Article 8 of the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union20 (“EU Charter”) provides 
that “everyone has the right to the protection of personal data concerning him or 
her” (para. 1) and that “such data must be processed fairly for specified purposes 
and on the basis of the consent of the person concerned or some other legitimate 
basis laid down by law”. Also, it is provided that “everyone has the right of access 
to data which has been collected concerning him or her, and the right to have it 
rectified” (para.2). It has been argued that a right to oblivion is not part of the 
Charter21 or the TFEU, since there is no clear provision that would allow an in-
dividual to have control of his data, such as through a clear right of deletion of 
data. 
Furthermore, as Commissioner Reading argued, the notion of consent, one of the 
fundamental principles underpinning the EU data protection scheme, does not suc-
17.  Kuschewsky M., The right to be forgotten–the fog finally lifts (2012), Privacy & Data Protec-
tion, vol. 12(3), pp. 10-12, at 11.
18.  Kierkegaard S., et al., supra note 14 at 225.
19.  Nys H., Towards a human right “to be forgotten online”? (2011) European Journal of Health 
Law, 18(5), pp. 469-475.
20.  Charter of the Fundamental Rights of the European Union (OJ C 364/1 of 18.12.2000). 
21.  Koops B.-J., Koops B.-J., Forgetting footprints, shunning shadows. A critical analysis of the 
“Right to Be Forgotten” in Big Data Practice, (2011) Scripted, vol. 8, issue 3, p. 247.
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ceed in its purpose as it is currently applied22. This is a fundamental reason that 
could prima facie justify the need to introduce a right to oblivion, taking into ac-
count the often complicated, misleading terms of use of several well-known inter-
net applications. A typical ‘one-click’ expression of consent, within an online en-
vironment where the user has no discretionary power to choose among different 
options/levels of use of his data, cannot simply be regarded as sufficient expression 
of consent, i.e. “a freely given specific and informed indication”23 of someone’s 
wishes. Indeed, “privacy is often considered to be sufficiently protected by giving 
the individuals the ‘power’ to (dis)agree”, but the notion of consent is a mere “illu-
sion of choice”24 since in reality “privacy policies are written in vague legalese, [...
there is a] lack of valid alternatives [...] and even a withdrawal of consent does not 
(necessarily) allow a person to have his or her data removed retroactively”25. 
Considering the above, it is clear that the current data protection framework 
is mainly inspired by what are known as “control-based” theories, i.e. the idea 
that a person should have full control over his personal information. Despite its 
significance, such an approach is in my opinion unable to provide effective pro-
tection from the threats imposed by modern technological developments. This 
conceptualisation is vulnerable to examples of “threatened losses” 26, e.g. where 
there has been no actual misuse of my data, but for an existing threat or cases 
“when there is no control over disclosure”27 such as those in which it seems that 
an individual has given up all his rights to controlling the use of his personal 
data.
Furthermore, Ausloos28 argues that the current data protection scheme takes 
“a proprietary approach to privacy protection”, which differs from the “person-
al privacy approach” adopted by the “European Convention of Human Rights” 
(“ECHR”). This matters, in my view, since the underlying value of the right to ob-
livion should not merely be the protection of proprietary interests in certain data 
but a number of interrelated fundamental values (e.g. autonomy, personality and 
dignity among others) covered by the right to privacy as a multidimensional con-
cept (discussed in section 5). 
22.  See also Bernal P. A., supra note 15 at. 4.
23.  Reding V., speech/10/441, Brussels, 16.10.2010. 
24.  Ausloos J., supra note 12 at 8 and the references provided.
25.  Ausloos J., ibid, at 6. (Note 12).
26.  Austin L., Privacy and the Question of Technology, (2003), Law and Philosophy, vol. 22, no. 
2, pp. 119-166, 125.
27.  Austin L., supra note 26 at 126.
28.  Ausloos J., ibid, at 3. (Note 12).
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4. Oblivion as a human right 
Feinberg defined a right as a claim first against specifiable individuals and sec-
ond with reference to their action or omission on one’s behalf.29 Naturally, the 
question arises: “When does someone’s interest become a justified claim upon 
others?” Tasioulas argues that our interests ground rights only if they are weighty 
enough to justify the imposition on others of duties to respect those interests30. 
Therefore, the actual difference between a right and a mere interest on which 
a right might be based is that the content of a right (and particularly a human 
right) is also the content of a corresponding duty31.
For the purpose of this article, we may endorse the spirit of the broader defini-
tion given by Raz32, that a concept/interest may be regarded as human right: a) 
if it can be shown that there is an individual interest which, according to certain 
social conditions, should be satisfied (moral right), and b) when the conditions 
are appropriate to create a duty to protect/respect/promote the interests of indi-
viduals identified in (a)33. Logically, if reaching the threshold of  ‘rights’ requires 
the existence of an important interest, then to enter the world of ‘human rights’ 
something more should be required. Griffin rightly suggests that only human in-
terests of “special importance” should be ring-fenced with the notion of human 
rights.34 
If we adopt this view, then a potential human right to oblivion could only be 
justified, if its underlying rationale is the protection of such a fundamental value, 
namely that was so important to human nature as to impose corresponding du-
ties to others to respect this value. However, Griffin argues further that to dis-
tinguish human rights from other interests, we should apply the condition of 
“practicalities”, i.e. that human rights must depend, to some extent upon their 
29.  Feinberg J., Rights, Justice and the Bounds of Liberty, (1980), Princeton University Press, 
chs. 6, 9-11.
30.  Tasioulas J., Human Rights, Universality and the Values of Personhood: Retracing Griffin’s 
Steps, (2002) European Journal of Philosophy, 10:1, pp. 79-100, 96.
31.  Tasioulas J., Taking Rights out of Human Rights (2010) Ethics, 120, pp. 647-678; Griffin, 
On Human Rights, (2008), Oxford University Press, p. 97.
32.  Raz J., Human Rights Without Foundations (2007), Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper 
No. 14/2007, p. 18. 
33.  In this context we are not concerned with Raz’s third condition which refers to a state’s lack 
of immunity from interference regarding these matters.
34.  Griffin J., First Steps in an Account of Human Rights, (2001) European Journal of Philoso-
phy, 9:3, pp. 306-327, 314.
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being “an effective, socially manageable, claim on others”35. For him, “rights bear 
a close relationship with duties. What is true of duties, meaning that you cannot 
ask from someone to do the impossible, is equally true of rights”. If it is impos-
sible for a thing to be done, it is absurd to claim it as a right36. 
Griffin’s argument simply defends the view that a right should not be introduced 
if it is in principle unenforceable. However, this is not necessarily true since if 
a right is impractical or unnecessary at time T in society S, should it not be a 
human right?37 In my view, that a right, in certain circumstances cannot be ad-
equately protected for all does not necessarily prevent it from being a human 
right.38 Applying this view in relation to the right to oblivion, I suggest that it 
should be conceptually approached in the light of the modern social world and 
not outside the notion of present human behaviour. Some countries are not so 
technologically advanced as to generate the need for a right to oblivion or chose 
not to apply it for any other reason, but this does not require us to exclude such a 
right from the concept of human rights in principle or to reject its existence, pro-
viding it fulfils Raz’s above mentioned conditions.
To conclude, if we want to include the right to oblivion among human rights, the 
main question is whether the right to oblivion protects such individual interests/
values of special importance, related to human existence, as to result in the crea-
tion of duties to others to protect it. 
5. The human right to oblivion 
5.1 Introduction
As the right to oblivion has not yet taken a solid form within the academic de-
bate, it is often discussed as a right, interest, value or a policy aim39. This pa-
per argues for a right to oblivion as a legal right and more particularly, a hu-
35.  Griffin J., ibid, at 315. Note 34.
36.  Cranston M., Are There Any Human Rights? (1983) Daedalus, MIT Press, vol. 112, no. 4, 
Human Rights, pp. 1-17, at 13. 
37.  Eddy K., On Revaluing the Currency of Human Rights, (2006), University of Oxford, Depart-
ment of Politics and International Relations/Centre for the Study of Social Justice, Working 
Paper Series SJ003, p. 6. Available in Politics. Philosophy and Economics, vol. 6, n. 3, 2007, 
pp. 307-328.
38.  Tasioulas J., Human Rights, Universality and the Values of Personhood: Retracing Griffin’s 
Steps, supra note 30 at 90.
39.  Koops B.-J., supra note 21 at 230; also Leaton Gray J., A right to be forgotten: the far-ranging 
implications (2011) Data Protection Law & Policy, 8(5), pp. 14-16.
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man right. Based on this principle, the logical sequence would be to ask what the 
scope of such a right might be. 
Despite the broad disagreement on its definition, most authors agree that a right 
to oblivion in the digital world aims in principle to grant an individual control 
not only of data related to unfortunate past events or the ability to prevent the 
publication of data in libel cases, but of all data40 in the digital world (data stored 
on the Web as well as organisational databases): i) generated by him (“digital 
footprints”), or ii) generated by others but relating to him (“data shadows”), e.g. 
search questions, purchases etc. 
A debate related to personal data seems prima facie to be related to the well-estab-
lished discussion on people’s right to a private life. Technology seems to be forcing 
us to reconsider and perhaps deepen our understanding of the nature of privacy as 
a human right as well to explain “why we are concerned about losses of privacy”41. 
5.2 The right to privacy as a multidimensional concept 
We have mentioned in section 3.1 that the current data-protection scheme is 
based upon the idea that a person should be able to control the information re-
lated to him; in other words that “knowledge about me is my property” 42. Ramsay 
argues that this constitutes a very narrow understanding of what privacy is in 
reality, as there is more to privacy than controlling information, as for example 
in cases where a person believes he is spied upon or where media is focused upon 
his life43. In such situations, he argues that a person does not seek to control the 
flow of information but simply to “be let alone”44. In addition, he suggests that 
autonomy itself, as the value of being able to develop and retain control over life 
and choices, cannot be the sole reason we need privacy as there are cases where 
we “spy [on] someone to protect their own autonomy [...] or to protect the au-
tonomy of all”45 as well as cases where for example someone is spied upon but is 
unaware of this and therefore his control over his life and choices is not threat-
40.  Murata K. & Orito Y., supra note at 192. (Note 3).
41.  Austin L., supra note 26 at 121.
42.  Ramsay H., Privacy, privacies and basic needs, (2010), The Heythrop Journal, 51(2), pp. 
288-297, 288.
43.  Ramsay H., ibid, at 289.
44.  Warren S. & Brandeis L., The Right to Privacy (1890) Harvard Law Review, vol. 15, no. 5, 
pp. 193-220. This view implies that the “right to be let alone” is merely only one aspect of 
the right to privacy.
45.  Ramsay H., supra note 42 at 289.
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ened46. Perhaps Weber’s suggestion that the “rightholders’ autonomy”47 should 
be the central idea when discussing potential threats to privacy rights in the dig-
ital world. Bernal’s48 view that besides the actual threat to an individual’s autono-
my, a “potential direct threat to autonomy”49 should equally be taken into account 
as it could arise from people’s feelings when under the threat of surveillance and/
or having their personal information potentially misused.
Recently, a number of attempts have been made to explain how privacy should 
be approached in the context of ongoing technological evolution. Several authors 
have argued that privacy should be understood as a “cluster concept” 50, i.e. that 
we should cluster together “certain of the conceptions instead of considering only 
one single conception”51. In other words, instead of trying to argue whether pri-
vacy aims to safeguard values such as “secrecy”, “control of personal informa-
tion”, and “personhood” (e.g. individuality, autonomy, dignity and other factors)52 
we should be aiming to claim an “interrelationship”53 of different values from a 
“multidimensional” approach” 54. Hugl55 summarises such an approach attempted 
by Burgoon et al.56, who defines privacy as “the ability to control and limit physi-
cal, interactional, psychological and informational access to one’s group or to the 
self”. More specifically, in this view: “a) the physical dimension refers to how 
physically accessible an individual is to others b) the psychological dimension 
looks to an individual’s right to decide with whom she or he shares personal in-
formation [...] c) the social dimension means the ability to control social interac-
46.  Ramsay H., ibid, at 289-290.
47.  Weber R.H., The Right to Be Forgotten: More than a Pandora’s Box? (2011) JIPITEC, vol. 2, 
pp. 120-130, at 128.
48.  Bernal P. A., A Right to Delete?, supra note at 15, available at: http://ejlt.org/article/
view/75/144. Last access June 10, 2013.
49.  Bernal P. A., ibid, at 15.
50.  Hugl U., Approaching the value of Privacy: Review of theoretical privacy concepts and as-
pects or privacy management, (2010), AMCIS 2010 Proceedings, Paper  248, p. 4-5.
51.  Hugl U., supra note 50 at 4.
52.  Solove D. J., Conceptualising privacy, (2002), California Law Review, Vol. 90, pp. 1087-
1156.
53.  Hugl U., supra note 50 at 6.
54.  Burgoon J. K., Parrot R., LePoire, B. A., Kelley D. L., Walther J. B. and Perry D., Maintain-
ing and restoring privacy through communication in different types of relationship, (1989), 
Journal of Social and Personal Relationships, vol. 6, pp. 131-158.
55.  Hugl U., supra note 50 at 4.
56.  Burgoon J. K. et al., supra note 54.
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tions [...] and d) the informational privacy dimension refers to an individual’s 
right to reveal personal information to others”57.
Along the same lines, Solove rightly observes that “not all privacy problems are 
the same, and different conceptions of privacy work best in different contexts. 
Instead of trying to fit new problems into old conceptions, we should seek to un-
derstand the special circumstances of a particular problem”58. Having identified 
the relevant circumstances we can then understand which dimension of privacy 
this disruption belongs to, which will then reveal the types of human goods that 
are threatened. 
5.3  The right to privacy as an “instrumental good” in the light 
of Aristotelian philosophy 
Having observed that privacy itself does not seem to be aimed by individuals for 
its own sake, Ramsey suggests that “[p]rivacy may not be one of the most basic 
of human goods – not one of the goods which actually constitute our well being, 
but it is one of the strategically vital, ‘second order’ goods without which our 
chances of securing well-being are dramatically reduced”59. His conceptualisa-
tion of privacy is based upon Aristotle’s idea that there are two kinds of objective 
human goods. On the one hand, there are “intrinsic goods”60 sought by people for 
their own sake and not in order to achieve or gain something else. On the other 
hand, there are “instrumental goods”61, i.e. the goods that we aim to achieve not 
for their own sake but so as to gain another greater good. Based on this concep-
tualisation of human goods, Ramsay rightly argues that privacy would never be 
pursued for its own sake but constitutes rather “one of the pre-conditions that 
must be satisfied if persons are to function, and function well, in respect of their 
most important capacities”62. 
Based on the above, Ramsey seems to be reaching the same conclusion as Tasiou-
las (see section 4) but from a different path. Ramsay argues that, assuming the 
idea of objective human goods is true, then when there is a human need to obtain 
a value necessary for “our natural functioning and flourishing”63, in other words 
a need to obtain an “instrumental good” which, once achieved, will allow us to 
57.  Hugl U., supra note 50 at 4.
58.  Solove D. J., Conceptualising privacy, supra note 52 at 1147.
59.  Ramsay H., supra note 42 at 293.
60.  Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book A, 1094a18-22.
61.  Ibid.
62.  Ramsay H., supra note 42 at 293.
63.  Also Finnis J., Natural Law and Natural Rights, 9th ed., (1996), OUP, p. 205.
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acquire a ‘basic’ (intrinsic) good, such as for example knowledge, health, friend-
ship etc., then “the rights-claim to what is needed can accurately be described as 
a ‘human right’”64. It is submitted that this conceptualisation of privacy based 
on Aristotle’s philosophy on human goods seems paradoxically65 to be hidden 
within the text of the current EU Data Protection Directive which provides that 
“data-processing systems are designed to serve man; [...] respect their fundamen-
tal rights and freedoms, notably the right to privacy, and contribute to [...] the 
well-being of individuals.
5.4 The right to oblivion as an “instrumental good” and a specific
     expression of a multidimensional right to privacy 
Having considered the broad debate in the literature, a summary of which was 
presented in section 2 of this paper, Koops identified three possible conceptu-
alisations of the right to oblivion. The first is a more widely accepted demand 
for personal data to be deleted in due time. The second is what he called a “clean 
slate” perspective, i.e. “that outdated data should not be used against people”. 
This approach could allow the right to oblivion to “be translated into sector-spe-
cific and context-specific norms specifying which online information should be 
included or excluded in decision making”66 (e.g. employment, public administra-
tion etc.). Finally, he presented an alternative “clean slate” perspective on the 
right to oblivion which refers to the need for an individual to feel unrestrained in 
expressing himself, which itself would then guarantee his self-development.67 In 
Koops’s own words, this third aspect “aims at preventing people from suffering 
unduly from information about their past, with connections to the right to pri-
vacy and identity construction”68. He argues that the first two perspectives could 
potentially constitute the content of a legal right. However, he considers that the 
third one could only have the character of “an interest or value”69.
Koops’s conceptualisation of the right to oblivion seems to cover satisfactorily 
the main broad areas which have been argued to fall under this concept, even 
though his definitions seem to partly overlap and therefore should be seen as 
complementary to each other. In our view, all three conceptual categories men-
64.  Ramsay H., supra note 42 at 294.
65.  Oddly enough, as we have shown, the DPD provisions reflect a pure “control-based” percep-
tion of privacy.
66.  Koops B.-J., supra note 21 at 252.
67.  Koops B.-J., ibid, at 254.
68.  Koops B.-J., ibid, at 253.
69.  Koops B.-J., ibid.
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tioned above can be conceptualised under a multidimensional right to privacy, 
and by doing so, all underlying values should be legally protected. 
More specifically, the first approach which summarises the “right to delete/eras-
ure”, mainly refers to the need to restrict “informational access” of third parties 
to certain personal information, which according to Burgoon et al.70 constitutes 
one of the dimensions of the right to privacy. This conceptualisation seems to 
reflect the traditional understanding of a right to privacy as a “control-based” 
mechanism (see section 3.1). 
The second perspective seems to refer to an individual’s need to avoid being sanc-
tioned, for example in his professional environment, in cases where information 
has been obtained about his past that is irrelevant to assessing his present and 
future potential. This need falls, prima facie, mostly under the “social dimension” 
of privacy, mentioned by Burgoon et al.71, as it protects an individual’s freedom 
to determine his social relationships with third parties.
Finally, the third perspective, in substance, falls both under the “psychological” as 
well as the “social” dimensions of privacy, as understood by Burgoon et al.72. By 
referring to the need to protect individual self-development and personal identity, 
this conceptualisation of the right to oblivion aims to safeguard individual autono-
my and dignity in cases where, despite the absence of any clear-cut unlawful use of 
personal information, an individual’s rights are nevertheless violated (e.g. where a 
person feels that is under surveillance by a social network or a search engine which 
collects data related to his actions, despite these data not yet having been used). 
Having described privacy as an instrumental good that aims to allow individuals to 
enjoy intrinsic goods, among which we have identified ‘autonomy’, and taking into 
account that this perspective of the right to oblivion aims to protect this exact val-
ue, i.e. personal autonomy/development, it can reasonably be argued that a claim 
against a threat to this value should be regarded as a human right claim. 
Consequently, based on the above, it seems that the right to oblivion, at least as 
conceptualised in the broadest possible terms (as provided by Koops), could be 
regarded as an expression of the multidimensional right to privacy, and therefore 
a human right. In addition, the right to oblivion is also an instrumental good, i.e. 
a mean to achieve a greater intrinsic good, since in fact, all three conceptualisa-
tions of the right seem to be aiming to protect basic human goods that are neces-
sary for human well-being, including autonomy, dignity and self-development. 
70.  Burgoon et al., supra note 54.
71.  Ibid.
72.  Ibid.
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6. Conclusions 
There seems to be no universal agreement, either on the substantial constituting 
elements of the right to oblivion in the digital world, or on the term that should be 
used to describe it. The disagreement on the conceptualisation of this right is a re-
sult of the absence of a holistic legislative initiative up to now, with the exception 
of the EC’s controversial recent proposal and of the absence of a systematic attempt 
to define the scope and rationale of this right. 
My view has been that oblivion has proven under certain circumstances to be a 
necessity, or in different terms, an instrument, to safeguard human well-being. I 
have attempted to show that a right to oblivion confirms the need for a paradigm 
shift in privacy, leading to a multidimensional conceptualisation of the right to 
privacy. This conceptual perspective does not require amending the ECHR73 in 
order to enforce an effective right to oblivion nor does it compel us “to invent a 
new theory of privacy”74. Therefore, the view that a right to oblivion “can only be 
read very indirectly into the right to privacy as formulated in art. 8(1) ECHR”75 is 
incorrect. Any future legal and political initiative concerning the right to oblivion 
as an expression of the right to privacy should not be dogmatically attached on the 
control-based understanding of personal information but rather constitute the out-
come of an objective philosophical dialectic on the foundations of the nature of the 
human person well as the conditions of “human flourishing”76. 
73.  Koops B.-J., supra note 21 at 247.
74.  Austin L., supra note xxvi at 164.
75.  Koops B.-J., supra note at 21 247.
76.  Ramsay H., supra note 42 at 296.
